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 THE SCHELLINGIAN ROOTS OF PEIRCE’S IDEALISM 




The German philosophy that immediately followed Kant inherited from him 
its main ideas and problems, initiating the era of idealism. Despite German Ideal-
ism is their common brand, Fichte and Schelling’s thoughts are, at the end, 
quite distinct considering some nuances. The former is the latter’s starting 
point; in his youth, he adopted the basic lines of Fichtean philosophy. Howev-
er, endowed with a profoundly poetic spirit that appears in many passages of 
his text, Schelling could not stand for long a total lackof the clear aesthetic qual-
ity inherent to German romanticism that colored Fiche’s Doctrine of Science. In-
deed, the principles of Fichtean philosophy evolve in the grounding of a sub-
ject that, starting from Kant, is increasingly internalized, acquiring a legislatorial 
character taking the Kantian problem of subjective constitution to a radical 
extreme. 
 During this period, the question of the «necessity-freedom» di-
chotomy was actively resumed under a dual trend: causality, as a fundamental 
rule of knowledge ensnaring the phenomenon in an antecedent-consequent 
web as inherited from the Kantian solution of Hume’s skepticism, and the 
libertarian winds of the French revolution, which brought about the reassertion 
of the subject’s innate unconditionality. The figure of the constitutive subject 
owes much to this necessary reassertion of freedom. «I» is the vertex from 
which emanate the ethical-libertarian edge engraved in the Enlightenment, as 
well as the epistemological-constitutive edge which marks the apology of ratio-
nality in the face of a supposedly definite deciphering of the principles of Na-
ture in the three laws of the Newtonian dynamics. 
 The specter of the Kantian thing-in-itself,however, remained in 
the center of the questions of Idealism. Fichte keeps it in innerness, resolving, 
by principle, this Kantian residue of the real world, which remained uncom-
fortably loose in Nature - that is, uncomfortably external to the self.An extreme solu-
tion was thus called for. Radically, innerness takes over the world to domesti-
cate it in light of a Selfthat emerges as an eminently practical being: the groun-
ding act is no longer solely theoretical; it is the action of that without which no 
reality is possible; and, on this stage built by an act of the subject, all moral acts 
are also played out. In a daring step that overcomes the Kantian dichotomy 
between the theoretical and practical spheres, Fichte merges them in a single 
world. Just for this reason that unknowable specter had also be ensnared in the 
inner self. The moral purpose of the subject legitimizes its establishment as 
cognitive and active being, disseminating to the non-selfand shaping it in its im-








age - in other words, creating it in accordance with its spirit. On this point, 
Neuhouser adds: 
 
Thus, Fichte will endeavor to prove the existence of practical reason by 
showing that such a faculty is a necessary condition for the possibility 
of theoretical reason […] Although the account of theoretical reason 
will precede that of practical reason in order of exposition, this strategy 
actually implies a primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason in 
the sense that the latter is shown to be grounded in, or conditioned by, 
the former1. 
 
 It is on the three principles of his 1794 Science of knowledge2 that 
Fichte achieves the basis of his project. The first one is a self-founding of the 
Self as the active apprehension of a consciousness of itself that posits itself: it 
is self-identical and so constitutes a sole and indissoluble unit in its genesis, 
scene of all reactions against which that, necessarily, will have to posit itself 
and oppose. Thus an absolute subjectivity, modeled on the logical principle of 
identity A = Aand grounded in the form of I = I,establishes itself and, as such, 
is absolute. This self-positing is, above all, practical.In the words of Hartmann: 
 
[…] neither the “I am” nor the “I think” of Descartes; but solely the “I 
act”. Kant’s transcendental perception, to which Fichte here conscious-
ly links himself, is not exhausted for him in being the supreme principle 
of cognitive consciousness; it also represents the supreme principle of 
practical consciousness.3 
 
 This self-identical «I» that senses its absolute freedom and po-
sits itself as innately practical is, for this reason, genetically productive; there shall 
no longer be an equivalence of rights between subject and object; the latterwill 
be the product of the former.That intellectual intuition which, according to 
Kant, is the source of all metaphysical errors, now becomes the ground of all 
                                                 
1F. Neuhouser, Fichte's theory of subjectivity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990, p. 47. 
2J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer), in Werke 
1793-1795,  Reinhard Lauth e Hans Jacobeds., Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Günther Holz-
boog), Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1965, pp. 173-478. English transl.: Id., Science of knowledge, Peter 
Heath e John Lachs eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003.  
3N. Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin/New York 
1974, p. 48: «[…] weder das “ich bin” noch das “ich denke” [Descartes] ist das Letzte, worauf 
die Reflexion hinausführt, sondern einzig das “ich handle”. Die transzendentale Apperzeption 
Kants, an die Fichte hier bewusst anknüpft, ist damit nicht erschöpft, dass sie oberstes Prinzip 
des erkennenden Bewusstseins ist; sie ist auch oberstes Prinzip des praktischen Bewusstseins». 








possible reality4. The work and product of this Self-primary productive action, 
exteriority antithetically comes into existenceas non-Selfin resistance to the Self’s 
absolute freedom. By opposing, then, a non-Self to the original I, a duality is 
established that must be resolved at the level of reason. This reduction of the 
objectto an integral function of the subjecttranslates into the formulation of the 
second principleof the Doctrine of Science: the Self positsthe non-Self as its oppo-
site; and this active, practical act of positing is what grounds the reality of the 
entire exteriority; without the subject and its act, it is nothing. The solution of 
this dichotomy is synthetically given in the third principleat the consummation of 
a dialectical process that has both its genesis and end in innerness. A possible 
conciliation is only accomplished by the constraint of that consciousness that, 
initially absolute, is cut and limited to contain that which is foreign to its free-
dom, but which it posited in itself. On the other hand, this cut and limitation 
cannot be restricted to consciousness; the otherposited must be a limited other-
for the conscious substratum to contain the opposition of two finitudes5. Thus 
the Self and non-Self are conciliated, mutually limiting in a process of synthesis 
that distinguishes the similarities and differences, but united under the same 
consciousness that, ultimately, requires the otheras resistance to its unlimited 
action, though initially it is solely a self-contemplation of its absolute freedom. 
Hartmann expresses well this fundamental trait of the Doctrine of science. 
 
If the practical behavior of the Self simply consists in pure activity that, 
without resistance, would be infinite, the practical I would coincide 
with the absolute I and, thus, there would be no need to explain self-
constraint. But this is not the case. Conduct, action and act are not an 
unlimited production, but rather an act on anything. Its activity is aspi-
ration and to aspire is to conquer. One can only conquer where there is 
resistance, one can only aspire to something where there is something 
that resists aspiration, that is, an obstacle; in a word, where there is an 
object to which one can, in some way, aspire. However, the object 
                                                 
4In R. R. Torres Filho, O espírito e a letra, Ática, São Paulo 1975, p. 67, it reads: «he finds intel-
lectual intuition as the “absolute form of knowledge, the pure form of ‘egoity’”. To say, then, 
from his viewpoint, that: “only freedom is the first immediate object of a knowledge” may be 
correctly translated as: knowledge only starts with self-consciousness». 
5Fichte is explicit as to this concept of limitation: «The self cannot posit the not-self without 
restricting itself. For the not-self is completely opposed to the self; what the not-self is, the self 
is not; [...] – The expressions to posit a not-self and to restrict the self are completely equiva-
lent, as was shown in the theoretical Science of Knowledge» (Science of knowlwdge, cit., pp. 222-
3). (Id, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre,cit., p. 389: «Das Ich kann das Nicht-Ich nicht setzen 
ohneQ sich selbst einzuschränken. Denn das Nicht-Ich ist dem Ich völlig entgegengesezt; was das Nicht-Ich ist. 
[/] ist das Ich nicht […]. Die Ausdrücke: ein Nicht Ich setzen, und: das Ich einschränken, sind völlig gleich-
geltend, wie in der theoretischen Wissenschaftslehre dargethan worden»). 








emerges for the theoretical I in its action of positing the non-Self as de-
terminant and real. Opposition, thus, is a condition of aspiration. The 
absolute Ihas to become theoretical to be practical; it first has to create 
the world of objects in whose resistance it shall become active6. 
 
 In fact, this reality posited by the subject in its own innerness to 
perform the necessary role of opposition is the means by which moral action 
becomes possible. In the standpoint of resolvable antithesis, the subject’s in-
nately grounding freedom must be redeemed, not only as a predicate of itself 
but as a predicate of an entire cognitive history of such a Self/non-Self dialectical 
relationship. For this reason, Fichte cannot admit the thing in itself outside of 
the subject; its ensnarement in innerness is, simultaneously, the basic condition 
for its overcoming. While the external and demarcatory thing-in-itself remained 
in Kant, in Fichte everything was radically internalized under the yoke of the 
active subject, whose mission is to recover a freedom experienced as self-
contemplation, creating a realm for itself where Nature is mere resistance that 
must be overcome. 
 To posit the non-Self within the absolute subject is to draw 
away from an infinite freedom toward an existence that also reacts as finite in a 
reciprocal determination of absolute opposites. Primarily, however, the abso-
lute Iis the ground where the world is fulfilled: «The source of all reality is the 
self, for this is what is immediately and absolutely posited. The concept of real-
ity is first given with and by way of the self.»7. 
 While being the instance where the world acquires its condition 
of possibility, the Self actively posits its own opposition to determine itself in 
finitude and, by doing so, posits something foreign to its absoluteness, which, 
inherently, has no opposites: «But man, insofar as the predicate of freedom is applicable 
to him, that is, insofar as he is an absolute and not a presented or presentable subject, has 
                                                 
6N. Hartmann, op. cit., p. 64: «Bestünde das praktische Verhalten des Ich einfach in der reinen Tätigkeit, 
die widerstandslos ins Unendliche ginge, so fiele das praktische Ich mit dem absoluten Ich zusammen, und dann 
wäre an eine Erklärung der Selbstbeschränkung von hier aus nicht zu denken. Das aber ist nicht der Fall. 
Praktisches Verhalten, Handlung, Wirken ist nicht unbeschränkte Produktion, sondern ein Einwirken auf 
etwas. Seine Tätigkeit ist Streben, Streben aber ist ein Überwinden. Nun lässt sich überwinden nur, wo ein 
Widerstand ist, strebennur, wo ein Widerstreben, eine Hemmung, kurz wo ein Gegenstand ist, an dem sich 
etwas erstreben lässt. Der Gegenstand aber entsteht dem theoretischen Ich in seiner Setzung des Nicht-Ich als 
eines Bestimmenden, Realen. Die Entgegensetzung ist also Bedingung des Strebens. Das absolute Ich muss 
theoretisch werden, um praktisch zu sein. Es muss sich die Welt der Gegenstände erst erschaffen, an deren 
Widerstand es handelnd werden soll». 
7
J. G. Fichte, Science of knowledge, cit., p. 129. (Id., Grundlage, cit.,1965, p. 293: «Aller Realität 
Quelle ist das Ich.A Erst durch und mit dem Ich ist der Begriff der Realität gegeben»). 








nothing whatever in common with natural beings, and hence is not contrasted to them ei-
ther.»8. 
 Torres Filho refers to Fichte’s statement in which he calls him-
self acosmistwhile affirming the nullity of the empirical world: «the given world – 
whether taken as a system of thing or as a system of determinations of con-
sciousness – absolutely does not exist in any strong sense of the word, and in 
its base and ground is nothing»9. 
 It is obvious that between the Self and the non-Self there can 
be no form of continuum, which, in itself, would only be the fundamental trace 
of that absolute consciousness filled by naught but itself: «It is thus that, be-
tween nature and intelligence, there cannot be any kind of continuity»10. 
 Schelling, for his part, in search of an Idealism in which Nature 
is not solely this obstacle to moral action, and after moving away from the  
basic principles11 of Fichtean thought he had absorbed in his youth, replaced 
that genealogical intellectual intuition by an eminently empirical intuition, 
where the aesthetic qualities of the world point toward a unity between con-
sciousness and Nature quite distinct from an empty and unlimited unity that is 
free but without a world where this infinitude can also be immediately appre-
hended. The Schellingian eye does not turn on itself as Fichte’s does; it opens 
to a Nature whose verbal silence is not indicative of a radical lack of language, 
but is rather a challenge to see it in time as a teleological process intelligently 
articulated by it12. 
                                                 
8J. G. Fichte, Science of knowledge, cit., p. 115. (Id., Grundlage, cit.,p. 277: «Aber der Mensch, insofern 
das Prädikat der Freiheit von ihm gelten kann, d.i. in sofern er absolut und nicht vorgestelltes noch vorstellbares 
Subjekt ist, hat mit den Naturwesen gar nichts gemein undv ist ihnen also auch nicht entgegengesezt»). 
9J. G. Fichte (SW, IV, p. 378), apud R. R. Torres Filho, op. cit., p. 76; my translation: «o mundo 
dado – quer seja tomado como sistema de coisas ou como um sistema de determinações da consciência – 
absolutamente não existe em nenhum sentido forte da palavra, e na sua base e fundamento não é nada». 
10 R. R. Torres Filho, op. cit., p. 80; my translation: «É assim que, entre a natureza e a inteligência, não 
pode haver nenhuma espécie de continuidade». 
11On this point, see Thomas Pfau in the Introduction to three essays by Schelling, in F. W. J. v. 
Schelling, Idealism and the endgame of theory: three essays, Thomas Pfau ed., SUNY Press, New York 
1994, p. 22-57. 
12In Ideas for a philosophy of nature (1797, 18032), the author mentions the aura that the philoso-
phy of Nature inherited since the beginning of Greek cosmological philosophy, which is not 
redeemable by reflexive philosophy, in an obvious reference to Fichte, stressing this utterable 
natural language: «Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the 
philosophy of mere reflection, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the 
pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered symbolic language, 
which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us the more intelligibly the 
less we think of her in a merely reflective way»(J. W. J. v. Schelling, Ideas for a philosophy of nature, E. E. 
Harris e P. Heath eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, p. 35; my italics).(Id., 
Ideiasparaumafilosofia da natureza, bilingual edition Carlos Morujãoed., Centro de Filosofia da 
Universidade de Lisboa/Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa 2001, pp. 98-9: «Daher der 








 Schelling’s reconciliation of ideality and reality will not be ac-
complished by conceiving the latter as a product of subjectivity, as a conse-
quence of a complete interiorization of the world, but rather by the extensio-
nality of the former to a subject-object relationship consummated in an onto-
logical idea of Nature and identity. The experience of infinitude that Fichte 
confined in the void of intellectual intuition becomes objectified in Schelling as 
aestheticexperience: «This universally acknowledged and altogether incontestable 
objectivityof intellectual intuition is art itself. For the aesthetic intuitionsimply 
is the intellectual intuitionbecome objective»13. 
 This objectified infinitude must, in turn, be the starting point of 
philosophy; art is the factual source of this merger of the finite and the infinite. 
The artist starts from this contradiction of expressing, in the finite work, the 
infinite that becomes the identity of the ideal and the real. Art is the primary 
document of this identity; the product, albeit conscious, manifests its produc-
tion: 
 
Just as the man of destiny does not execute what he wishes or intends, 
but rather what he is obliged to execute by an inscrutable fate which 
governs him, so the artist, however deliberate he may be, seems none-
theless to be governed, in regard to what is truly objective in his crea-
tion, by a power which separates him from all other men, and compels 
him to say or depict things which he does not fully understand himself, 
and whose meaning is infinite14. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
eigenthümliche Schein, der um diese Probleme her ist, ein Schein, den die bloβ speculative Philosophie, die nur 
auf Trennung ausgeht, nie zu entwickeln vermag, während der gesunde Verstand, oder vielmehr die schöpferische 
Eingildungskraft längst die symbolische Sprache erfand, die man nur auslegen darf, um zu finden daβ die 
Natur um so vertändlicher zu uns spricht, je weniger wir über sie spekuliren»). 
13 F. W. J. v. Schelling, System of transcendental idealism, P. Heath ed., University Press of 
Virginia, Charlottesville 1978, p. 229; my bold type. (Id., System des transzendentalen Idealismus, in 
Ausgewählte Schriften, Band I (1794-1800), Manfred Franked., Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 19851, p. 
693: «Diese allgemein anerkannte und auf keine Weise hinwegzuleugnende Objektivität der intellektuellen 
Anschauung ist die Kunst selbst. Denn die ästhetische Anschauung eben ist die objektiv gewordene intellektuel-
le»). 
14Ivi, p. 223. (Ivi, p. 685: «Ebenso wie der verhangnisvolle Mensch nicht vollführt, was er will, oder beabsich-
tigt, sondern was er durch ein unbegreifliches Schicksal, unter dessen Einwirkung er steht, vollführen muss, so 
scheint der Künstler, so absichtsvoll er ist, doch in Ansehung dessen, was das eigentlich Objektive in seiner 
Hervor – bringung ist, unter der Einwirkung einer Macht zu stehen, die ihn von allen andern Menschen ab-
sondert, und ihn Dinge auszusprechen oder darzustellen zwingt, die er selbst nicht vollständig durchsieht, und 
deren Sinn unendlich ist.Da nun jenes absolute Zusammentreffen der beiden”). 








 The undeniable polysemy of the work of art, and Schelling’s 
original concept that contemporaneity seems to ignore by proposing, as new, 
the idea of an open work, assumes full importance in that author in the philo-
sophical sphere, since the artistic product is a form of documentation of the 
Absolute and a means for the ideality-reality-ideality transference in a continuu-
mof possibilities where the central idea of freedom is engraved. This unruliness of 
the sensesof the artist that overcomes his or her initial or even final intentionali-
ty, Schelling calls an unconscious activitytransgressing consciousness;it is the work of 
art that consummates the identity between them15. There is an unconscious 
poetics permeating ideality and reality that, as a universe of heuristic possibili-
ties, overcomes merely conscious activity; such an unconscious poetics is the 
metamorphosing and necessary ability to achieve the artistic object: 
 
If we are to seek in one of the two activities, namely, the conscious, for 
what is ordinarily called art, though it is only one part thereof, namely, 
that aspect of it which is exercised with consciousness, thought and ref-
lection, and can be taught and learnt and achieved through tradition 
and practice, we shall have, on the other hand, to seek in the uncons-
cious factor which enters into art for that about it which cannot be 
learned, nor attained by practice, nor in any other way, but can only be 
inborn through the free bounty of nature; and this is what we may call, 
in a word, the element of poetry in art16. 
 
 Aesthetic experience reveals the One, the Absolute; this must 
be the primary point of all philosophy: hence the importance of art for it. The 
Absolute now is no longer excluded from the sphere of possible experience; on 
the contrary, it is original immediate experience in which there is this exclusion of 
timein the full consciousness of infinite. Schelling sees in a primary experience 
                                                 
15Ivi, p. 225. This point is reaffirmed here: «Hence, that which appears to us outside the sphere 
of consciousness, as real, and that which appears within it, as ideal, or as the world of art, are 
also products of one and the same activity»(Ivi, p. 230). (Ivi, p. 694: «Es ist ein und dasselbe, was in 
beiden thätig ist, das Einzige, wodurch wir fähig sind auch das Widersprechende zu denken und zusammenzu-
fassen, – die  Einbildungskraft. Es sind also auch Produkte einer und derselben Thätigkeit, was uns jenseits 
des Bewusstsehns als wirkliche, diesseits des Bewusstsehns als idealische, ader als Kunswelt erschein».) 
16Ivi, p. 222-23. (Ivi, p. 686: «Wenn wir in der einen jener beiden Thätigkeiten, der bewussten nämlich, das 
suchen müssen, was insgemein Kunst genannt wird, was aber nur der eine Theil derselben ist, nämlich dasjenige 
an ihr, was mit Bewusstsehn Ueberlegung und Reflexion ausgeübt wird, was auch gelehrt und gelernt, durch 
Ueberlieferung und durch eigne Uebung erreicht werden kann, so werden wir dagegen in dem Bewusstlosen, was 
in die Kunst mit eingeht, dasjenige suchen müssen, was an ihr nicht gelernt, nicht durch Uebung, noch auf 
andere Art erlangt werden, sondern allein durch freie Gnust der Natur angeboren sehn kann, und welches 
dasjenige ist, was wir mit Einem Wort die Poesia in der Kunst nennen könne»). 








of world an entirety that does not oppose itself, that does not resist and that 
interiorizes itself as an aesthetic feeling. 
 Fichte, on the other hand, in order to banish resistance, requires 
that genetic grounding innerness of self-identity that leads him to experience 
the empty freedom of the empirical. However, for Fichte this spirit is a gift 
from a divinity that remains hidden: God remains absolutely Otheras infinitude; 
Nature is absolutely otheras finitude. The absolute Iis primarily alone, and this 
solitude can never be broken by the presence of the non-Selfin consciousness: 
they are as antagonistic as spirit and stone. 
 In Bruno(1802)17, Schelling seems to invite Fichte to abdicate 
from that innate solitude: 
 
So, come now, abandon that narrow strand that you clung to before, 
when you tried to confirm the supreme identity to the domain of con-
sciousness! Venture with me upon the free ocean of the absolute, 
where we shall move with greater freedom, the more we come to di-
rectly know the heights and the depths of reason! 
 
 But would Schelling’s placing the Absolute as genesis within the 
cognitive realm legitimately make of his philosophy a pre-critical regression, as 
some scholars might suspect? As a faithful heir of Kant, Schelling could not 
make an epistemological discourse on the Absolute without first preparing a 
suitable space in the universe of possible experience. In this respect, the Abso-
lute is primarily given as an aesthetic experience that, in turn, is the sensitive 
expression of absolute freedom: no longer of the Self alone, but of the whole of 
the subject-Nature identity. This experience of the very order of the ineffable is 
absolutely consummated as a contemplation that, ultimately, is the aesthetic 
transgression of the possibility of the abstract concept: 
 
Thus, to know the eternal is to contemplate, in things, being and think-
ing solely unified by their essence, but not to place, be it the concept as 
effect of things, or things as effect of the concept. Nothing is more dis-
tant from truth than this. For thing and concept are not one through a 
linkage of cause and effect, but through the Absolute and, truly consi-
dered, are solely the different perspectives of one and the same; for 
                                                 
17 F. W. J. v. Schelling, Bruno, or On the natural and the divine principle of things 1802, Michael G. 
Vater ed., State University of New York Press, Albany 1984, p. 190. (Id., Bruno, oder Über das 
göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge, Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1954, p. 85: «Du wirst also diese 
Enge, in der du dich zuvor festgehalten, indem du die höchste Einheit auf das Bewuβtsein eingeschränkt hat-
test, verlassen, und dich mit mir in den freien Ozean des Absoluten begeben, wo wir uns sowohl lebendiger 
bewegen, als die unendliche Tiefe und Höhe der Vernunft unmittelbar erkennen werden». 








nothing exists that had not been finitely and infinitely expressed in the 
eternal. […] 
[…]Nevertheless, the natureof that eternal in itself and for itself is diffi-
cult to express in mortal words18. 
 
 From that original experience of infinite, Schelling brings the 
Absolute to the interior of the Universe, making of the latter the external and 
finite expression of the former. This is one of the points of Schelling’s criticism 
of the philosophies that consider God outside of Nature and of Man, perpe-
tuating the opposition between finite and infinite: 
 
Through this opposition, men have learned to see nature outside of 
God, and God outside of nature and, insofar as they have divested the 
former of the sacred need, they subordinated it to the profane that they 
call mechanical, but for this very reason, made of the ideal world the 
stage of a lawless freedom.At the same time, insofar as they have deter-
mined the former as a merely passive being, they believed they have 
acquired for themselves the right to determine God, who they raise 
above nature, as pure activity, pure activeness, as if one of these con-
cepts had not remained and perished with the other, and had truth by 
itself. […] But if they are told that nature is not outside of God, but in 
God,they understand by it this nature that was killed by the separation 
from God, as if this, generally, were something in itselfor, generally, 
something more that the creature created by they themselves19. 
                                                 
18F. W. J. v. Schelling,Bruno, oder Über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge, Kar-Maria Gu-
thed., Hofenberg, Berlin 2014 (ed. orig. 1802), p. 71: «Das Ewige demnach erkennen, heiβt, in den 
Dingen Sein und Denken nur durch sein Wesen vereinigt erblicken, nicht aber, es sei den Begriff als die Wir-
kung des Dings oder das Ding als Wirkung des Begriffs zu setzen. Dieses ist die weiteste Entfernung von der 
Wahrheit. Denn Ding und Begriff sind nicht durch. Verknüpfung von Ursach und Wirkung, sondern durch 
das Absolute eins, wahrhaft betrachtet aber nur die verschiedenen Ansichten eines und desselben; denn nichts 
existiert, was nicht im Ewigen endlich und unendlich ausgedrückt ware […] Die Natur indes jenes Ewigen an 
und für sich selbst durch sterbliche Worte auszudrücken ist schwer, da die Sprache von den Abbildern herge-
nommen und durch den Verstand geschaffen ist»). 
19Ivi, p. 99: «Durch diese Entgegensetzung haben die Menschen gelernt, die Natur auβer Gott, Gott aber 
auβer der Natur zu sehen, und, indem sie jene der heiligen Notwendigkeit entzogen, sie der unheiligen, welche 
sie mechanisch nennen, untergeordnet, die ideale Welt aber eben dadurch zum Schauplatz einer gesetzlosen 
Freiheit gemacht. Zugleich, indem sie jene als ein bloβ leidendes Sein bestimmten, glaubten sie sich das Recht 
erworbea zu haben, Gott, den sie über die Natur erheben, als reine Tätigkeit, lautere Aktuosität zu bestim-
men, als ob nicht der eine dieser Begriffe mit dem andern stande und fiele, keiner aber Wahrheit für sich hätte 
[…] Sagt man ihnem aber, daβ die Natur nicht auβer Gott, sondern / in Gott sei, so verstehen sic darunter 
diese eben durch die Trennung von Gott getötete Natur, als ob diese überhaupt etwas an sich, oder überhaupt 
etwas anderes als ihr selbst gemachtes Geschöpgware»). 









 This text highlights Schelling’s critique of both Kant and Fichte 
– of the former, in the reference to the concept of Nature as a thing in itself; of 
the latter, in the considerations of subjective ideality as a stage of a lawless freedo-
mand of Nature as mere creature of subjectivity. Even Spinoza, whom he ge-
nuinely admired as «the first who, with a complete clarity, saw mind and matter 
as one»20, made the mistake of placing the identity of the ideal and the real out-
side the human in an Infinite Substance21. 
 Nevertheless, what Schellingian concept joins this primary in-
tuition of infinitude, explicating the way in which Nature is in the Absolute, 
and conversely? What does that experience of totality, ineffable of genesis, 
legitimize in the universe of the utterable? Schelling conceived Nature as the 
finite aspect of the infinite, i.e., the external expression of the divinity that, 
from potency, is made actuality and becomes known. Nevertheless, as this ex-
teriority is the finite form of the infinite, such becoming knowncannot be to an 
other,for: «The absolute produces nothing out of itself except itself, thus again an absolute»22. 
Therefore: 
 
The Absolute is an eternal act of cognition, which in itself is matter and form, 
a creating in which, eternally, it makes of itself in its wholeness as idea, 
as pure identity, realm form and inversely, but equally eternally, dis-
solves itself as form, to this extent as object in essence or in subject23. 
 
 The reflectivity of the Fichtean subject migrates, in Schelling, to 
the Absolute. As eternal act of cognition, subjectivity is a kind of innerness in the 
exteriority of the Absolute; one could say that contemplation is nothing more 
than self-contemplation of an infinite process of exteriorization as Nature. 
                                                 
20F. W. J. v. Schelling, Ideasfor a philosophyofnature, cit., p. 15.(Id., Ideiasparaumafilosofia da natureza, 
cit., p. 50: «Der erste, der Geist und Materie als Eines, Gedanke und Ausdehnung nur als Modifikationen 
desselben Princips ansah, war Spinoza»). 
21Ivi, p. 28. This paper does not intend to discuss Espinosa’s position on this issue but solely to 
present the reading that Schelling makes of that author. 
22 F. W. J. v. Schelling, Ideas for a philosophy of nature, cit., p. 48. (Id., Ideiasparaumafilosofia da nature-
za, cit., p. 57: «Das Absolute producirt aus sich nichts als sich selbst, also wieder Absolutes; jede der drei 
Einheiten ist der ganze Absolute Erkenntnissakt und wird sich selbst als Wesen oder Identität, ebenso wieder 
wie das Absolute selbst, zur Form. Es ist in jeder»). 
23Ivi, p. 136: «Das Absolute ist ein ewiger Erkenntnissakt, welcher sich selbst Stoff und Form ist, ein Produ-
ciren, in welchem es auf ewige weise sich selbst in seiner Ganzheit als Idee, als lautere Identität, zum Realen, 
zur Form wird, und hinwiederum auf gleich ewige Weise sich selbst als Form, insofern als Objekt, in das 
Wesen oder das Subjekt auflöst».) This original unity is also explicated here: «[…] that insofar as the 
infinite is embodied into a finite, the latter, as finite, is itself again embodied into the infinite, 
and that both these unities, with respect to that essence, are [...]» (Ivi, p. 49). 








Ideal and real merge in that unity of the Absolute in reciprocal connaturally. 
Divinity permeates all, engraving in the finite a symbolic character: 
 
In eternal Nature the absolute becomes, for itself in its absoluteness 
(which is sheer identity), a particular, a being, but in phenomenal nature 
only the particular form is known as particular, the absolute veils itself 
here in what is other than is in its absoluteness, in a finite, a being, 
which is its symbol, and as such, like every symbol, takes on a life inde-
pendent of that which it means. In the ideal world it lays the veil aside, 
as it were, and appears even as that which it is, as ideal, as act of cognition, 
but, on the other hand, in such a way that it leaves the other side be-
hind and only contains the one, that of resolution of the finitude in in-
finitude, of the particular in the essence.24. 
 
 In the Stuttgart Seminars(1810), Schelling proposes the formula 
A/(B=C) to express that the Real (B) keeps a relation of original identity with 
the Ideal (C), under the Absolute (A), affirming that «[t]his is not to say tha the 
Real and the Ideal are numerically or logically the same but, instead, designates 
an essential unity»25. In this work, he writes further: 
 
We are frequently questioned over how, if philosophy conceives of 
God as its ground, we can arrive at any knowledge of God or the Ab-
solute. There is no answer to this question. The existence of what is 
unconditional cannot be proven as the existence of something finite. 
The unconditional is the element on which any demonstration becomes 
possible […] Philosophy is occupied with the progressivedemonstration 
of the Absolute, which cannot be required as a principle of philoso-
phy26. 
                                                 
24Ivi, p. 50. (Ivi, p. 136: «In der ewigen Natur wird das Absolute (welche lautere Identität) ein Besonderes, 
ein Seyn, aber auch hierin ist es absolute-Ideales, absoluter Erkenntnissakt; in der eerscheinenden Natur wird 
nur die besondre Form als besondre erkannt, das absolute verhüllt sich hier in ein andres, als es selbst in seiner 
Absolutheit ist, in ein Endliches, ein Seyn, welches sein Symbol ist und als solches, wie alles Symbol, ein von 
dem was es bedeutet unabhängiges Leben annimmt. In der ideellen Welt legt es die Hülle gleichsam ab, es 
erscheint auch als das, was es ist, als Ideales, als Erkenntnissakt, aber so, dass es dagegen die andre Seit zu-
rücklässt und nur die eine, die der Wiederauflösung der Endlichkeit in der Unendlichkeit, des Besondern in das 
Wesen, erhält»). 
25 Id., Idealism and the endgames of theory, cit., p. 198. (Id., Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen, cit., p. 34: «Die 
Meinung ist hier nicht, dass das Reale und Ideale numerisch oder logisch einerlei sey; es ist eine wesentliche 
Einheit gemeint»). 
26Ivi, p. 35-6: «Es ist eine gewöhnliche Frage die: wenn die Philosophie Gott zu ihrem Grund macht, wie 
gelangen wir zu Erkenntnis Gottes oder des Absoluten? ─ Auf diese Frage gibt es keine Antwort. Die Exis-
tenz des Unbedingten kann nicht erwiesen werden wie die des Bedingten. Das Unbedingte ist das Element, 









 Thus, it is a fact that there is no definitely deductive proof of 
the Absolute or, as Kant well demonstrated, there is no call to venture in the 
game of antinomies in this respect. However, this passage in Schelling’s work 
tacitly suggests an idea of the task of philosophy in progressive demonstration as 
well as the author’s consciousness that his thought is not a regression to a pre-
critical metaphysics. In what concerns to that role of philosophical activity, 
there is a concept of progressivity that is not confined only to an evolution of 
making-philosophy along the time, but also to the gradual exteriorization of 
the Absolute as Nature. Knowledge, in other words, does not objectify some-
thing lifeless, already accomplished as a process. This is an evolutionary view of 
Nature and of its representation, which, in the analysis of the conception of 
the Absolute in Schelling, was well characterized by Arthur Lovejoy in The 
Great Chain of Being: «But true philosophy and truly objective science are not a 
chanting of tautologies. Their object is always a concrete and living thing; and 
their progress and evolution is a progress and evolution of the object itself»27. 
 This concept of the exteriorization of the Absolute’s atemporal-
ity in time, as Lovejoy comments further, is original in the face of emanationist 
and creationist ideas: 
 
God himself was temporalized  was indeed identified with the 
process by which the whole creation slowly and painfully ascends the 
scale of possibility; or, if the name is to be reserved for the summit of 
the scale, God was conceived as the not yet realized final term of the 
process. Thus for emanationism and creationism came to be substi-
tuted what may best be called radical or absolute evolutionism  the 
typically Romantic evolutionism of which Bergson’s L’évolutioncréatice is 
in great part re-editing28. 
 
 It is in the Idea of an eternally processive Nature that Schelling 
sees this living symbolof the Absolute as the gradual transposition of the infinite 
                                                                                                                            
worin allein Demonstration möglich ist. […] sonder die ganze Philosophie beschäftigt sich mit diesem Dasein, 
die ganze Philosophie ist eigentlich der fortgehende Beweis des Absoluten, der daher nicht im Anfang derselben 
gefordert werden darf»). 
27A. Lovejoy, The great chain of being, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1982, p. 324. 
The author is emphatic in stressing the importance of this idea of evolution present in Schel-
ling’s work: «It is – as has too little been noted by historians – in this introduction of a radical 
evolutionism into metaphysics and theology, and in the attempt to revise even the principals of 
logic to make them harmonize with an evolutional conception of reality, that the historical 
significance of Schelling chiefly consists»(Ivi, p. 325). 
28Ivi, p. 317. 








to the finite; lifein Nature, observable as a phenomenon, places the Schellingian 
philosophy before all those that have as a concept of exteriority an inexorable 
other that, lifeless in itself, merely obstructs the freedom of the Absolute: 
 
No wonder that language, used dogmatically, soon lost sense and 
meaning. So long as I myself am identical with Nature, I understand 
what a living nature is as well as I understand my own life; I apprehend 
how this universal life of Nature reveals itself in manifold forms, in 
progressive developments, in gradual approximations to freedom. As 
soon, however, as I separate myself, and with me everything ideal, from 
Nature, nothing remains to me but a dead object, and I cease to com-
prehend how a life outside me can be possible29. 
 
 To Schelling it is certainly believable that where there is freedom 
there is life. And the knowledge of life is no longer acquired in the immediate-
ness of aesthetic intuition, but rather through temporal observation of the 
processes of nature that reveal organisms endowed with purpose: 
 
Only in organized beings are they [the objects] real; they exist without 
my participation, because there is an objective relationship between 
them and the whole. Thus a concept lies at the base of every organiza-
tion, for where there is a necessary relation of the whole to the part and 
of the part to the whole, there is concept. But this concept dwells in the 
organization itself, and can by no means be separated from it; it orga-
nizes itself, and is not simply, say, a work of art whose concept is to be 
found outside it in the understanding of the artist. Not only its form 
but its existence is purposive […] In the organic product for this very 
reason, form and matter are inseparable; this particular matter could 
only arise and come to be along with this particular form, and vice-
versa. Every organization is therefore a whole; its unity lies in itself; it 
does not depend on our choice whether we think of it as one or as 
many30. 
                                                 
29F. W. J. v. Schelling, Ideas for a philosophy of nature, cit., p. 36. (Id., Ideias para uma filosofia da 
natureza, op. cit., p. 100: «Kein Wunder, daβ jene Sprache scientifisch und dogmatisch gebraucht, bald selbst 
Sinn und Bedeutung verlor. So lange ich selbst mit der Natur identisch bin, verstehe ich, was eine lebendige 
Natur ist, so gut, als ich mein eignes Leben vestehe; begreife, wie dieses allgemeine Leben der Natur in den 
mannichfaltigsten Formen, in stufenmäβigen Entwicklungen, in allmähligen Annäherungen zur Freyheit sich 
offenbaret. Sobald ich aber mich von der Natur trenne, bleibt mir nichts übrig, als ein todtes Objekt, und ich 
höre auf zu begreifen, wie ein Leben auβer mir möglich seye»). 
30 Ivi, p. 31. (Ivi, p. 88: «Im organisirten Wesen allein sind sie real, sie sind da ohne mein Zuthun, 
weil zwischen ihnen und Ganzen ein objektives Verhältniβ ist. Also liegt jeder Organisation ein Begriff zu 









 Although Schelling refers to the realas simply that which is out-
side of us,be it particular or general, contrary to scholastic realism that distin-
guishes realfrom existent,there emerges in this last passage, in the idea of organ-
ism,in which lies a conceptresponsible for its systemic behavior, the reality of the 
universal as law,whose fabric is of an intellectual nature31. Further, two points 
of this passage must be stressed: on the one hand, it affirms this law in 
self32and, on the other hand, defines it as independent of our thought. This 
realistic stance that deals unrestrainedly with the thing in itself, and with an other-
nessthat ultimately derives from an utter repudiation of subjective constitution, 
is legitimized by the Schellingian Absolute Idealism. In fact, the idea of living 
organismas a teleological conduct originating in experience is a proof of it. Only 
a mental nature, unified in the concept of matter, can attribute this telosto 
life.Also according to the author, the mere mechanical scheme of causality can-
not explain this living and purposeful character of natural organizations: 
 
Cause and effect is something evanescent, transitory, mere appearance 
(in the usual sense of the word). […] So, if the purposiveness of the or-
ganic product is to be explained, the dogmatist finds himself completed 
deserted by his system. Here it no longer avails to separate concept and 
object, form and matter, as it pleases us. For here, at least, both are 
originally and necessarily united, not it our idea, but in the object itself. 
I should like one of those who take playing with concepts for philoso-
phy, and fantasies of things for real things, to venture with us into this 
field33. 
                                                                                                                            
Grunde, denn wo nothwendige Beziehung des Ganzen auf Theile und der Theile auf ein Ganzes ist, ist Begriff. 
Abe dieser Begriff wohnt in ihr selbst, kann von ihr gar nicht getrennt werden, sie organisirt sich selbst, ist nicht 
etwa nur ein Kunstwerk, dessen Begriff auβer ihm im Verstande des Künstlers vorhanden ist. Nicht ihre Form 
allein, sondern ihr Daseyn ist zweckmäβig. […] Im organischen Produkt ist eben deswegen Form und Materie 
unzertrennlich, diese bestimmte Materie konnte nur zugleich mit dieser bestimmten Form, und umgekehrt, 
werden und entstehen. Jede Organisation ist also ein Ganzes; ihre Einheit liegt in ihr selbst, es hängt nicht von 
unsere Willkühr ab, sie als Eines oder als Vieles zu denken»). 
31Peirce, incidentally, comments on this presence of thought in Nature: «Thought is not neces-
sarily connected to a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the 
purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the 
shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and 
you will be driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte’s»(CP 4.551). 
32To Schelling, the concept of a thing in itself is absolutely meaningless, calling it a speculative 
chimera, extracted from Leibniz and taken to an extreme by Kantian transcendentalism. (Cf. Id., 
Ideas for a philosophy of nature, cit., p. 16). 
33Ibidem. (Ibidem: «Ursache und Wirkung ist etwas Vorüberschwindendes, bloβe Erscheinung (im gewöhnli-
chen Sinne des Worts). […] Soll also die Zweckmäβigkeit der organischen Produkte erklärt werden, so sieht 









 Opposing, in a fictitious dialogue, someone advocating a sub-
jectivist idealism34, Schelling states: 
 
Hence the first thing that you grant is this: Any conception of purpose 
can arise only in an intelligence, and only in relation to such intelligence 
can anything be called purposive […] When you think of each plant as 
an individual in which everything concurs together for one purpose, 
you must seek the reason for that in the thing outside you: you feel 
yourself constrained in your judgment; you must therefore confess that 
the unity with which you think it is not merely logical (in your though-
ts) but real (actually outside you)35. 
 
 It is interesting to see that the so-called German Idealismmani-
fests a certain conceptual affinity between its members; it houses both the rad-
ical realism of an author like Schelling together with the critical idealism of 
Kant and the subjective idealism Fichte. However, while the latter authors are 
the starting point for Schelling, he clearly distances himself surgically from 
their idealisms grounded on the constitutive subject. His fundamental critique 
of the viewpoint of subjective constitution, as regards the empirical evidence of 
natural law, is centered on the assumption of giving form to the phenomenon: 
 
That which is form in the things, they [some philosophers] say, we in-
itially imposed on the things. But I have long sought to know just how 
you could be acquainted with what the things are, without the form 
                                                                                                                            
sich der Dogmatiker völlig von seinem Systeme verlassen. Hier hilft es nicht mehr, Begriff und Gegenstand, 
Form und Materie zu trennen, wie uns beliebt. Denn hier wenigstens ist beydes nicht in unserer Vorstellung, 
sondern im Objekt selbst ursprünglich und nothwendig vereinigt. Auf dieses Feld, wünschte ich, wagte sich mit 
uns einer von denen, die ein Spiel mit Begriffen für Philosophie, und Hirngespinnste von Dingen für wirkliche 
Dinge halten»). – To this viewpoint of Schelling, Andrew Bowie adds: «Schelling’s fundamental 
idea in Naturphilosophie is that the organized character of the mind (Geist) and the organized 
character of nature, absolutely, cannot be separated» (A. Bowie, Schelling and modern european 
philosophy:an introduction, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1993, p. 38). 
34Which, incidentally, does Schelling define as «relative idealism» featured by «only one of the 
sides which, without the other, is unthinkable». 
35 F. W. J. v. Schelling, Ideas for a philosophy of nature, cit., p. 32. (Id., Ideiasparaumafilosofia da natu-
reza,cit., p. 92: «Das Erste also, wsa ihr zugebt, ist dieses: Aller Begriff von Zweckmäβigkeit kann nur in 
einem Verstande entstehen, und nur in Bezug auf einen solchen Verstand, kann irgend ein Ding zweckmäβig 
heiβen {…} Daβ ihr aber jede Pflanze als ein Individuum denkt, in welchem Alles zu Einem Zweck zu-
sammenstimmt, davon müβt ihr den Grund in dem DING AUSSER euch suchen; ihr fühlt euch in euerm 
Urtheil gezwungen, ihr müβt also einräumen, daβ die Einheit, mit der ihr es denkt, nicht bloβ logisch [in 
euern Gedanken] sondern real [auβer euch wirklich] ist»). 








which you first impose on them, or what the form is, without the 
things on which you impose it. You would have to concede that, here 
at least, the form is absolutely inseparable from the matter, and the 
concept from the object. Or, if it rests with your choice whether or not 
to impose the idea of purposiveness on things outside you, how does it 
come about that you impose this idea only on certain things, and not 
on all?36 
 There is clearly, in Schelling’s realistic view, this otherness that 
hinders the judgment of the subjective constitution. It seems fitting to consider 
that the vector of ontological determination is from the object to representa-
tion. On the other hand, it is evident that in the mind-matter unity as professed 
by Schelling, there must be gradual stages of life, i.e., from less free and deter-
mined forms to freer and more undetermined ones: «there is a hierarchy of life 
in Nature. Even in mere organized matter there is life, but a life of a more re-
stricted kind»37. 
 By contrast, by not conceiving in the phenomenon this auton-
omy of the law that confers order to exteriority, Kant like Fichte, cannot 
attribute life to matter in the sense of acknowledging in it an organized substra-
tum of an intellectual nature. Thus, for example, in his Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Sciences(1786), Kant38 relates the inertia of matter to an absence of 
life, whereas in the evolutionary prism of Schellingian philosophy the question 
of the genesis of subjectivityalmost naturallyemerges. And we purposefully stress the 
naturalnessof the question because it can have an unencumbered treatment with-
in a realistic and evolutionary philosophy, contrary to the hindrances that it 
provokes within nominalism. Andrew Bowie stresses this aspect in the follow-
ing passage: 
 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy has no way of explaining this genesis. For 
the Kant of the theoretical philosophy, answers to such questions of 
genesis depend upon the cognitive functioning of the already consti-
                                                 
36Ivi, p. 33. (Ivi, p. 92: «Zwar giebt es Philosophen, die für alle diese Fragen Eine Univesalantwort haben, 
die sie bey jeder Gelegenheit wiederholen und nicht genug wiederholen können: (…) Was an den Dingen Form 
ist, sagen sie, tragen wir erst auf die Dinge über. Aber eben das verlange ich längst zu wissen, wie ihr das 
könnt? Was denn die Dinge sind ohne die Form, die ihr erst auf sie übertragt? Oder was die Form ist, ohne die 
Dinge, auf welche ihr sie übertragt? Ihr muβt aber zugeben, daβ hier wenigstens die Form von der Materie, der 
Begriff vom Objekt schlechterdings unzertrennlich ist. Oder wenn es in eurer Willkühr steht, die Idee von 
Zweckmäβigkeit auf Dinge auβer euch überzutragen oder nicht, wie kommt es, daβ ihr diese Idee nur auf 
gewisse Dinge, nicht auf alle übertragt?»). 
37Ivi, p. 35. (Ivi, p. 98: «… es gebe eine Stufenfolge des Lebens in der Natur. Auch in der bloβ organisirten 
Materie sey Leben; nur ein Leben eingeschränkterer Art»). 
38I. Kant, Metaphysical foundations of natural science, J. Ellington ed., Bobbs-Merrill, New York 
1970, p. 105. 








tuted subject, which means that one has no right to ask how such sub-
ject itself becomes constituted. Schelling justifiably thinks that this is 
insufficient to account for our ability to understanding the nature of 
which we are a part39. 
 
 This question in Schelling is clear in the following passage of 
Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature,in which he states that the rule of causality, fun-
damental for a mechanical worldview, does not apply to that which is endowed 
with growth and life: 
 
[…] the concepts of cause and effect are altogether inapplicable to a 
mind. It is, therefore, absolutely self-explanatory of its being and know-
ing, and just because it exists at all, is also what it is, i.e., a being to 
whose nature this particular system of ideas of external things also be-
longs […] Philosophy, accordingly, is nothing other that a natural history 
of our mind. From now on all dogmatism40 is overturned from its foun-
dations. We consider the system of our ideas not in its being, but in its 
becoming. Philosophy becomes genetic; that is, it allows the whole ne-
cessary series of our ideas to arise and take its course, as it were, before 
our eyes. From now on there is no longer any separation between ex-
perience and speculation. The system of Nature is at the same time the 
system of our mind, and only now, once the great synthesis has been 
accomplished, does our knowledge return to analysis (to research and 
experiment)41. 
 
 To let the mind flow just as it is, would be the same as saying 
that its natural form will force itself experientially upon its representation, in 
the formation of all its nuances. There is now an originfor the mind-matter af-
                                                 
39A. Bowie, op. cit., p. 34. 
40It should be remembered that Schelling considers dogmatic all philosophies that underlie 
their reading of Nature exclusively on causality. 
41F. W. J. v. Schelling, Ideas for a philosophy of nature, cit., p. 30; italics mine. (Id., Ideiasparaumafilo-
sofia da natureza, cit., pp. 84-5: «Denn er behauptet ausdrücklich, kein Geist könne entstanden seyn, d.h. 
auf einen Geist lassen sich Begriffe von Ursache und Wirkung gar nicht anweden. Er ist also albsoluter Selbst-
grund seines Seyn und Wissens, und dadurch, dass er überhaupt ist, ist er auch das, was er ist, d.h. ein Wesen, 
zu dessen Natur auch dieses bestimmte System von Vorstellungen äuβerer Dinge gehört Philosophie also ist 
nichts anders, al seine Naturlehre unsers Geistes. Von nun an ist aller Dogmatismus von Grund aus umge-
kehrt. Wir betrachten das System unserer Vorstellungen nicht in seinem Seyn, sondern in seinem Werden. Die 
Philosophie wird genetisch, d.h. sie läβt die ganze nothwendige Reihe unserer Vorstellungen vor unsern Augen 
gleichsam entstehen und ablaufen. Von nun an ist zwischen Erfahrung und Spekulation keine Trennung mehr. 
Das System der Natur ist zugleich das System unsers Geistes, und jetzt erst, nachdem die groβe Synthesis 
vollendet ist, kehrt unser Wissen zur Analysis [zum Forschen und Versuchen] zurück»). 








finity and a radical rupture of the estrangement between innerness and exte-
riority or, in other words, between subject and object. As a method, the Schel-
lingian philosophy is primarily synthetic42; analysis finds its legitimacy in that es-
sential unity. Thus, there is in Schelling no characterization of a dialectic of 
opposites whose synthesis occurs within subjectivity through apriori forms, an 
operation that, by not revealing its genesis,dichotomizes the necessary link be-
tween representation and world43. It is thus that intuition, as originary locusof all 
knowledge, is no longer the sole primary organizing instance of the phenome-
non, conferring to it only a spatio-temporal structure, but also the faculty that 
legitimately apprehends the external must-beto the conditions of truth of repre-
sentation:«From this it is clear why intuition is not as many pretended philoso-
phers have imagined the lowest level of knowledge, but the primary one, the 
highest in the human mind, that which truly constitutes its mental nature»44. 
 Experience becomes the central vertex where the formpenetrates 
subjectivity, constituting not a path for substantially estranged matter, but mat-
ter that is innate and exclusively mental: 
 
[…] we are required to know not how such a Nature arose outside us, 
but how even the very Idea of such a Nature has got into us […] What 
we want is not that Nature should coincide with the laws of our mind 
by chance (as if through some third intermediary), but that she herself, 
necessarily and originally, should not only express, but even realize, the 
laws of our mind, and that she is, and is called, Nature insofar as she 
does so45. 
 
                                                 
42Another passage that reaffirms this point is: «It is safer, therefore, to allow the concept to 
arise, as it were, before our eyes, and thus to find the ground of its necessity in its own origin, 
This is the synthetic procedure»(Id., Ideas for a philosophy of nature, cit., p. 172). 
43Id., Ideiasparaumafilosofia da natureza, cit., p. 76: «Daher die abentheuerliche Erklärung die dieses System 
vom Ursprung der Vorstellung zu geben genöthigt ist. Den Dingen an sich stellt es gegenüber ein Gemüth, und 
dieses Gemüth enthält in sich gewisse Formen a priori, die vor den Dingen an sich nur den Vorzug haben, daβ 
man sie wenigstens als etwas absolute-Leeres vorstellen kann. In diese Formen warden die Dinge gefaβt, indem 
wir sie vorstellen. Dadurch erhalten die formlosen Gegenstände, Gestalt, die leeren Formen Inhalt. Wie es 
zugehe, daβ Dinge überhaupt vorgestellt werden, darüber ist tiefes Stillschweigen». 
44Id., Ideas for a philosophy of nature, cit., p. 177. 
45Ivi, pp. 41-42. (Ivi, p. 114: «Ihr habt uns damit so gut wie nichts erklärt, denn wir verlangen zu wissen, 
nicht, wie eine solche. Natur auβer uns entstanden, sondern wie auch nur die Idee einer solchen Natur in uns 
gekommen seye; […] Denn wir wollen, nicht daβ die Natur mit den Gesetzen unsers Geistes zufällig (etwa 
durch Vermittelung eines Dritten) zusammentreffe, sondem daβ sie selbst nothwendig und ursprünglich die 
Gesetze unsers Geistes ─ nicht nur ausdrücke, sondern selbst realisire, und daβ sie nur in so fern Natur seye 
und Natur heiβe, als sie dies thut»). 








 Philosophy as the natural history of our mindis legitimized as also 
being a Philosophy of Nature and of the Identity if the ideal and the real, 
enabling Schelling to state that: «Nature would be the Mind made visible, and 
the Mind the invisible Nature»46. 
By refusing deterministic causality as an exclusive method of inquiry, 
Schelling, although not having lived in the environment of indeterminism that 
emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, predicts through his ideas 
of freedom and systemic organization of the products of Nature a science that 
addresses the partial indetermination of objects. This tacit indeterminism of 
Schelling is grounded in this triple relationship between life, freedom and 
mind: «So here again, we meet that absolute unification of Nature and Free-
dom in one and the same being. The living organism is to be a product of Na-
ture: but in this natural product an ordering and coordinating Mind is to 
rule»47. 
 It seems adequate to state that Schelling redeems God, soul, 
and freedom to the sphere of the cognoscible, by being primary grounds of all 
experience. Freedom is revealed not only temporally in the intuition that pro-
vides the observation of life in Nature, whether in conscious innerness or un-
conscious exteriority48, but also in that non-time of aesthetic, primary intuition 
of the Absolute. This is what transpires in the following passage of Philosophical 
Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom(1992): «Only those who savored free-
dom can feel the desire of making everything similar to it, and making the en-
tire Universe a part of it»49. 
 Although adjusted to the Idea of progress in the romanticism of 
that era, Schelling did not experience the atmosphere of evolutionism typical of 
the mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the idea of evolution is patently 
present in his philosophy, redeeming a chaos-cosmos vector of ancient philos-
ophy: 
                                                 
46Ivi, p. 42. (Ivi, p. 114: «Die Natur soll der sichtbare Geist, der Geist die unsichtbare Natur seyn»). 
47Ivi, p. 36. (Ivi, p. 102: «Also begegnen wir hier abermals jener absoluten Vereinigung von Natur und 
Freyheit in Einem und demselben Wesen, die belebte Organisation soll Produkt der Natur seyn; aber in diesem 
Naturprodukt soll herrschen ein ordnender, zusammenfassender Geist»). 
48According to Schelling, nature, while manifesting itself in exteriority, in the process of form-
ing its organization is unconscious because it is absolutely free, though the actsof freedom are not 
endowed with intentionality. The purpose found in organisms, in turn, makes them endowed 
with consciousness. In the human instance, artistic production starts consciously, but the open 
meaning of the product is associated with a form of unconsciousness. (See F. W. J. v. Schel-
ling, System of transcendental idealism, cit., p. 204-28). 
49F. W. J. v. Schelling, Philosophical inquiries into the nature of human freedom, J. Gutmann ed., Open 
Court, La Salle 1992 (orig. ed. 1809), p. 45. (Id. Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, H. Fuhr-
mansed., Phillip Reclam Jun., Stuttgart 1964, p. 63: «Nur wer Freiheit gekostet hat, kann das Verlan-
gen empfinden, ihr alles analog zu machen, sie über das ganze. Universum zu verbreiten»). 









After the eternal act of Self-revelation, everything in the world is as ap-
pears to us now: law, order and form; but there remains, however, in 
the background, that which has no rule, as if it could, one day, erupt 
once more; and nowhere is it shown that order and form represent that 
which is primitive; it seems, on the contrary, that out of an initial dis-
order order was implanted50. 
 
 Hartmann51, in turn, synthesizes Schellingian thought on the is-
sue: 
 
Nature’s evolutionary process follows a principle of progressive diffe-
rentiation in whose beginnings is absolute “indifference”, but, at the 
same time, also follows a principle of progressive production of the su-
perior in which the original trend of the unity of the whole is exempli-
fied […] This thought casts a decisive light on the essence of nature as 
totality, for a primary force that, constantly growing, creates from itself 
its own opposition and is reduced to the reciprocal action of polar 
forces, can clearly only be a living force [...] 
 
 It is in that non-time of initial chaos and its unity that aesthetic 
intuition penetrates, transgressing Nature’s forms of time and order, and find-
ing that infinite and original freedom. Likewise, it is in this immediacy that art 
recalls its indefinable source that science can only know through the way this 
source is exteriorized in finitude and temporality. 
 These forms of cognition, art and science, in the Schellingian 
universe, have distinct paths but the same object: 
 
As to the particular relationship between art and science, these are op-
posites in trend, since if science were to fulfill its full task, as art has al-
ways done, both would coincide and merge into one – which is the 
proof of the opposing directions that both have. For science, at its 
                                                 
50Ivi, p. 58. (Ivi, p. 72: «Nach der ewigen. Tat der Selbstoffenbarung ist nämlich in der Welt, wie wir sie 
jetzt erblicken, alles Regel, Ordnung und Form; aber immer liegt noch im Grunde das Regellose, als könnte es 
einmal wieder durchbrechen, und nirgends scheint es, als wären Ordnung und Form das Ursprüngliche, sondern 
als ware ein anfänglich Regelloses zur Ordnung gebracht worden»). 
51N. Hartmann, op. cit., p. 139 (Id., op. cit., p. 117: «Der Entwicklungsprozess der Natur folft einem 
Prinzip fortschreitende Differenzierung, an dessen erstem Anfang die absolute "Indifferenz" steht, -- zugleich 
aber auch einem Prinzip fortschreitender Produktion des Höheren, woran sich die ursprüngliche Einheitsten-
denz des Ganz dokumentiert [...] Dieser Gedanke wirft das entscheindende Licht auf das Wesen der Natur 
als Ganzes; denn eine Urkraft, die dem Gegensatz immer wieder potenziert aus sich hervortreibt und in der 
Wechselwirkung polarer Kräfte sich auslebt, kann offenbar nur eine lebendige Kraft sein [...]»). 








highest level, though having the same objective as art, such objective, 
due to the way in which it is reached, is endless for it, and where art is, 
science is yet to be52. 
 
 Moving with total freedom through the ideality of the external 
and internal worlds, art becomes a heuristic expression that is raw material for 
philosophical reflection on a cosmic poetics:«The objective world is simply the 
original, as yet unconscious, poetry of the spirit; the universal organon of phi-
losophy – and the keystone of its entire arch – is the philosophy of art» 53. 
 Thus in Schelling’s philosophy science and art are based on a 
principle of synthetic genesis.The task of both is innately heuristic and must, in 
infinite time, as a trend, flow into one another. According to our thinker: «a 
system is only complete when led back to its starting point»54.And for this rea-
son: 
 
Philosophy was born and fed by poetry in the infancy of knowledge 
and, with it, all those sciences that were guided toward perfection; thus, 
we must wait for them, on completion, to flow back, as many individu-
al streams to the ocean of poetry whence they originated55. 
                                                 
52 F. W. J. v. Schelling, Idealism and the endgame of theory,cit., p. 227. In Bowie’s reading of Schel-
ling, there is a negation of the possibility of a science of art: «A work of art is not art because it 
shares the same attributes as other objects, or because it may be defined in relation to them, 
but because it reveals the world in its own particular way. There cannot be, therefore, any 
science of art»(A. Bowie, op. cit., p. 52). Cf. also F. W. J v. Schelling, System of transcendental ideal-
ism,  cit., p. 227: «So far as particularly concerns the relation of art to science, the two are so 
utterly opposed in tendency, that if science were ever to have discharged its whole task, as art 
has always discharged it, they would both have to coincide and merge into one --which is proof 
of directions that they are radically opposed.For thought science at its highest level has one 
and the same business as art, this business, owing to the manner of effecting it, is an endless 
one for science, so that one may say that art constitutes the ideal os science, and where art is, 
science has yet to attain to [...]» (Id., System des transzendentalen Idealismus, in Id., Ausgewählte Schrif-
ten, Band I [1794-1800], M. Franked., Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 19851, p. 69: «Was Insbesondere das 
Verhältnis der Kunst zur Wissenschaft betrifft, so sind sich beide in ihre Tendenz so sehr entgegen gesetz, das 
wenn die Wissenschaft je ihre ganze Aufgabe gelöst hätte, wie sie die Kunst immer gelöst hat, beide in Eines 
zusammenfallen und übergehen musten, welches der Beweis vollig entgegengesetzter Richtungen ist. Denn obg-
leich die Wisenschaft in ihren höchsten Funktion mit der Kunst eine und dieselbe Aufgabe hat, so ist doch diese 
Aufgabe, wegen der Art sie zu lösen, fur die Wissenschaft eine unendliche, so, dass man sagen kann, die Kunst 
sey das Vorbild der Wissenschaft, und wo die Kunst sey, soll die Wissenschaft erst Hinkommen»). 
53Ivi,  p. 12. 
54Ivi, p. 232. (Ivi, p. 696: «Wir schliessen daher mit der folgenden Bemerkung – Ein System ist vollendet, 
wenn es in seinen Anfangspunkt zuruckgeführt ist […]»). 
55Ivi, 232, italics mine. (Ivi, 697: «[…] zu ziehen, zu erwarten, das die Philosophie, so wie sie in der 
Kindheit der Wissenschaft von der poesie geboren und genährt worden ist, und mit ihr alle diejenigen Wissen-
schaften, welche durch sie der Vollkommenheit entegengeführt werden, nach ihre Vollendung als ebenso viel 









 Not without reason, Schelling returns to mythology as redemp-
tion of this lost origin of philosophy56. This entire heuristic challenge of reco-
vering an ultimately original philosophy, such as Schelling’s, requires for its 
acceptance, according to the author himself, an aesthetic sense57essential for a 
look that, turned either to innerness or exteriority, does not discern two oppos-
ing worlds where lifeis solely confined in a subjectivity intended as origin of 
unity, as if there could be a prophylaxis capable of ensuring an arsenal of facul-
ties independent of experience, but which, in fact, dogmatically does not show 
its primary credentials. Thus, to Schelling, the pristine indifferentiation of ideal 
and real assures heuristic grounds not only for science, but also for the arts, 
making them related as activities of the spirit.  
 In short, while the temporality of history traces a long and en-
during path for science, necessary for the obtainment of identity between the 
logical forms of human thought and Nature, in the a-temporality of poetry 
everything is already pre-contained as virtually written as an amorous and plea-
surable invitation to the deciphering of the Absolute. 
 Therefore, not without reason, Schiller’s thought seems wholly 
welcome in the Schellingian philosophy in the proposition: «The way to the 
intellect must be opened by the heart»58. 
 
 
Epilogue: On Peirce’s idealism – the Schellingian roots  
To compare Schelling’ and Peirce’s ontologies would require not a simple es-
say, but certainly a whole book. Notwithstanding such limitation, the present 
essay is destined to scholars who reasonable know the grounds of Peirce’s on-
tology, to which I hope it could show the theoretical closeness between him 
and Schelling.  Regarding Peirce’s metaphysics, particularly his theory of reality 
or ontology, it is worth remembering that it was firstly influenced by Duns 
Scotus’s realism, which affirmed the reality of universals, namely, real generali-
                                                                                                                            
einzelne Strome in den allgemeinen Ocean der Poesie zurückffiessen, von welchem sie ausgegangen 
waren […]»). 
56In this respect, Schelling conjectures: «But the way in which a new mythology can emerge, 
such that it should be the creation not of some individual author, but of a new race, personi-
fied as if it were a sole poet – is a problem whose solution can only be visualized in the world’s 
future destinies and in the course of the history that is to come into being» (Ivi,pp. 232-33).(Ivi, 
p. 697: «Diese, wie es jetzt scheint, unauslosliche Trennung geschehen ist. Wie aber eine neue Mythologie, 
welche nicht Erfindung des eizelnen Dichters, sondern eines neuen, nur Einen Dichter gleichsam vorstellenden 
Geschlechts seyn kann, selbst entstehen konne, dies ist ein Problem, dessen Auflösung allein von der kunstigen 
Schicksalen der Welt und dem weiteren Verlauf der Geschichte zu erwarter ist […]»). 
57Ivi, p. 14. see also R. R. Torres Filho, op. cit., p. 142. 
58F. Schiller, On the aesthetic education of man, Dover, New York 2004, Letter VIII. 








ties as a true acting part of Nature. In his mature thinking, Peirce improved his 
realism through his studies of the logic of relatives and his Synechism or theory 
of continua, proposing his realism in a new formula, expressed in the question 
that follows in this passage: 
 
(…) the ‘continuum’ is that which the logic of relations shows the true 
universal to be. I say the true universal; for no realist is so foolish as to 
maintain that no universal is a fiction. Thus, the question of nominal-
ism and realism has taken this shape: Are any ‘continua’ real?59 
 
Then, ontological generalities were re-conceptualized as real continui-
ties. It is interesting to highlight that Peirce and Schelling have theoretic axial 
similarities that can be found in their writings under different vocabularies. By 
the way, it can be mentioned, for instance, their common admission of a real-
ism of continuities, which in Peirce corresponds to two of his three categories, 
namely, firstness and thirdness. Firstness is cosmically grounded on its internal 
sphere as a continuum of possibilities, continuum of qualities of feeling, while its 
external manifestation in Secondness is ruled by Chance: «Wherever chance-
spontaneity is found, there in the same proportion feeling exists. In fact, 
chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling».  The 
third category is the mode of being of continuities of forms - logical forms of 
necessity. In fact, to be fairer with Peirce’s indeterminism, quasi-necessity 
forms, performed by laws of Nature. Both continuities can be found in Schel-
ling’s philosophy of Nature. Firstness as the phenomenological esthetic expe-
rience of infinite, provided by a sort of unconscious contemplation of Nature 
or a work of art in their many manifestations. The qualia that are a part of Na-
ture are the immediate presence of the Absolute that may be experienced as 
unity, indeed as originary unity.  Schelling abundantly mentions natural logical 
forms as I suppose this paper endeavored to show. It seems quite licit to con-
sider him a realist in the same way Peirce is, surely under different vocabulary. I 
think that it is licit to say that the reader somewhat acquainted with Peirce’s 
ontology will realize a similar philosophical environment that sometimes expli-
citly, sometimes tacitly, promotes the closeness between the two thinkers: a 
sort of poetic ground that rules the stage where both philosophies develop 
their main ideas60.  
                                                 
59C. S. Peirce, NEM-IV (orig.ed. 1898) p. 343. 
60See I. A. Ibri, Reflections on a poetic ground in Peirce’s philosophy, «Transactions of The Charles S. 
Peirce Society», 45, 3, 2009, pp. 283-30.; see also Id., The continuity of life: on Peirce’s objective ideal-
ism, in Vinicius Romanini e Eliseo Fernandes (eds.), Peirce and biosemiotics: a guess at the riddle of 
life, Springer, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/New York/London 2014, where I exposed Peirce’s ideal-
ism as rooted in Schelling’ objective idealism. 








It is worth stressing again the realism shared by both, negating all phi-
losophy of an anthropocentric nature and, on the other hand, the ontological 
indeterminism essential in both. In Schelling, the real being of the Absolute as 
Nature prevents it from being regarded as a mechanism ruled by necessity: it is 
innately pure freedom and its passage from the infinite to the finite cannot 
imply abdication from it. In Peirce, freedom is also revealed in the most prima-
ry experience: that of firstness. That phenomenological experience of unity of 
consciousness, of a rupture with objective time, is connected with the reality of 
Chance, on a journey promoted by the arrow of hypothesis in its search for 
final conciliation between appearing and being. In both thinkers, no longer is 
there a polarizing subject, founder and creator of a formal asymmetry with 
Nature. On the contrary, in these thinkers one may visualize an effort to de-
centralize the subject from ontology, creating symmetries with the object that 
enable a natural transition between innerness and exteriority. In Peirce, this 
transition relates, fundamentally, to the possibility of a semiotic trade between 
the human and the natural; the intelligibility of Nature confirms the experience 
of aesthetic unity with it; both experiences derive from the understanding that, 
between subject and object, there must not be, innately, a relation of estrange-
ment. It is in this unity and intelligibility that Peirce and Schelling see a more 
compact and genetic presence of philosophy. They are experiences of enc-
hantment and awe, not surprisingly conducive, in both authors, to the concep-
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